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One of the striking developments in academic law in the past half-century is the reconception of 
law as one of the social sciences. The idea at work in this movement, as Joseph Vining says in 
this chapter, is not that the law should use the findings of other disciplines for its own purposes 
and in its own ways, but that in some deep way law itself  legal thinking, legal life  can and 
ought to proceed on the premises of social science, indeed of science itself. This is in one sense 
obviously impossible: a scientific rule is a prediction of future events based upon prior 
experience; a legal rule is the expression of a mind speaking to other minds  to other persons  
seeking to affect their behavior by shaping their sense of the meaning as well as the 
consequences of what they do. Law works by an appeal from mind to mind. 
Yet in academic law, as in the culture more generally, the image of science as the 
paradigm of thought, including legal thought, has enormous presence and force; and the 
inherent dehumanization of this kind of thought  the erasure of the human person, the voice, the 
mind, the elimination of human value and hope  threatens law and democracy both at their 
core. 
Vining’s deep claim is that even in the face of these forces of dehumanization and 
trivialization law retains a life and vigor, a resilience, upon which we can found our hopes and 
seek to build. 
 
*   *   * 
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After my first year in Law School and a summer at a New York law firm, which I loved, 
I was home for a bit before returning to my second year.  It was 1962.  My father, an economist 
who had studied under Frank Knight and Oskar Lange at Chicago in the 1940s, came into my 
room with the manuscript of a book he was working on.  Its title was On Appraising the 
Performance of an Economic System: What an Economic System Is, and the Norms Implied in 
Observers' Adverse Reactions to the Outcome of Its Working.  This was going to be my legacy, 
he said.  If he did not finish it, he hoped I would. 
The book's argument was that an economic system was in fact a system of legislated 
rules, within the bounds of which economic actors made their decisions, responding of course to 
incentives and disincentives and others' actions under these conditions.  It was a "mechanism," 
the behavior of which, in the sense of outcomes of its overall action over time, was to be 
described statistically.  What the economist participating in the legislative process was to do was 
to determine and set out for legislators considering a change in a rule what the statistical 
consequence of the change would be, with respect to one or another parameter such as income 
inequality or employment in which legislators were interested because they were dissatisfied.  
For clarity he proposed a notation: "The modifiable operating mechanism, the thing for which 
economic system is the name..., I shall denote by {›,S}."  The "S" represented the collection of 
statistical mechanisms that depended upon the ›, and "[t]he ›," he said, "is to represent a set of 
constraining and prescriptive rules...," that part of the thing that is "directly" modifiable, a 
"system" of "statutory law and administrative rule."  To be useful or even relevant, economists 
were to start with the set of rules that could be so denoted by the abstract symbol ›. 
2
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 87 [2008]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art87
3 
I read into the manuscript and eventually came to my father and said I could not help 
him.  I could not help him because my sense of a "law" or a collection of "laws" was so very 
different.  Law, I had already seen, was expressed in words spoken by responsible human beings 
to one another, who were listening to one another, and reexpressed and respoken over time.  The 
meaning and effect of a "piece" of human law in the world, its very existence beyond the shadow 
existence a "dead letter" has, depended upon its authority which came from constant mutual 
work with it.  Laws might have systematic qualities but law was alive in a way rules that make a 
system are not.  Law could die as well as live.  There is a world of difference, I might have said 
if I had been older, between the authoritative and the authoritarian. 
My father took the manuscript away.  The problem I had was too central, the difference 
between us unbridgeable.  He published the book twenty years later,1 two years before I 
published The Authoritative and the Authoritarian,2 and in one of those strange encounters of 
life, indeed as something of a sign of what has happened, his editor at the Cambridge University 
Press came to where I was working, to head up the University of Michigan Press. 
The gulf between human law and rules that can be represented by an abstract symbol 
remains as large today.  My father's work was a chapter in the history of those who were 
involved in economics waking up to law, which was then in time followed by those in law 
waking up to economics.  If they were academic lawyers ⎯ rather than practitioners, judges, or 
prosecutors and attorneys general carrying on the everyday work of law ⎯ larger and larger 
numbers of them entered a period of trying to accede to the claims of economics upon our 
thought, and beyond economics, the claims of social science, and beyond social science, the 
claims of scientific thought generally.  The last were claims to a total occupation of the mind that 
grew so much over this same period, connected I think to twentieth century experimentation with 
totalisms of various other kinds. 
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James Buchanan, whose Calculus of Consent3 appeared in 1962, the same year as my 
conversation with my father, and who received the 1986 Nobel Prize in Economics for "public 
choice theory," speaks of "'the economic theory of politics'" involving "the extension of homo 
economicus to behavior under observed institutional rules."  He treats my father's work as its 
precursor in several ways, principally in "initiating what was to become a centrally important 
component..., the stress on rules as contrasted with the then universal stress on policy alternatives 
within rules."4  Like "public choice theory," "mechanism design theory" in current economics 
also has evident affinities with what On Appraising the Performance of an Economic System was 
seeking to achieve in its focus on law.5  I do not think my father, in his work, participated in the 
elimination of public value and the melding of the premises of social science with those of 
natural science that is encapsulated in Buchanan's phrase homo economicus.  My father's 
choosers and modifiers of rules legislatively or administratively still acted on behalf of a larger 
entity.  But he was first of all a statistician.  He repeatedly presented the true form of a rule as the 
rule of an ordinary game, and was enamored of game theory which was then new.6  He was 
himself a "player," to use that term for a successful academic lawyer heard commonly in law 
schools now ⎯ he was devoted to football.  He thought of mathematics as the ultimately serious 
form of thought ⎯ hence the abstract symbol › precisely denoting the "set" of rules.  While he 
might have demurred in life, in his professional capacity he would have understood how the 
geneticist and Nobelist François Jacob could say in his Logic of Life, published 
contemporaneously with On Appraising the Performance of an Economic System, that there is 
"no longer a difference in nature between the living and the inanimate worlds," that "statistical 
analysis and the theory of probability have supplied the rules for the logic of the whole world," 
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and that "[l]arge numbers are studied not so much because it is impossible to investigate the 
individual units, but mainly because their behavior is of no interest at all."7 
So, despite my father walking out of the room with his manuscript in 1962, that 
manuscript was a legacy to me.  The fundamental premises of its thought began to appear in 
academic law about the time I entered it.  It was not just economics in the form celebrated by 
Buchanan's Nobel Prize.  It was the turn toward social science more generally, and despite 
doubts going back to its beginning, the turn of social science to the natural sciences.  Into law ⎯ 
the most linguistic of disciplines, person speaking to person, individuals listening and speaking 
on behalf of persons ⎯ was imported the view that the discipline of law was a branch of social 
science.  The American Academy of Arts and Sciences makes it such today, and academic 
lawyers post their online papers on the Social Science Research Network. 
The public treatment of human language in academic law reflects these developments in 
an important way.  In 1961 Paul Freund, a name still known in constitutional law, gave a little 
talk to my first year moot court club to introduce us to the world of law.  He would "say a few 
things about words, and then a few words about things."  His theme was the problem, for law, of 
writing dictionaries on the assumption that the difference between the "statistical" norm and the 
"normative" norm could be eliminated ⎯ the problem this presented for nuance in expression, 
the problem of the "impoverishment of language."  Freund noted that law "lived by metaphor, 
advanced by simile."  It "created," really, in its "overarching concepts."  Speaking of the 
development of number theory in mathematics which he viewed as analogous but not the same, 
he said to us "the legal achievement is no less a grand and important thing."  A generation later, 
in 2006, I listened to a younger colleague give a talk on a public occasion in which he implied 
everyone knew that "there was no sharp line between language and law."  I inwardly nodded.  
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Then he went on, "and no sharp line between language and logic, or between logic and 
mathematics."   
This ultimate turn, to mathematics, indicates how far the fact we are speaking together 
can disappear from view.  There are Vicos and Collingwoods still arguing and Alfred Marshall's 
introduction to The Principles of Economics is still there to be read,8 but social science cannot 
escape its connection to the natural sciences and the premises or commitments of the natural 
scientist today.  Most social scientists would not want to escape them.  As the recent Report of 
the quite representative University Commission setting up the new Life Sciences Initiative at 
Michigan observed, 
"Closely allied to the life sciences are the social sciences, which, though 
distinctive in their definition, are in fact concerned with a particular level of 
analysis in living organisms (usually humans).  Indeed the boundaries 
between neuroscience (a life science) and psychology (a social science) are 
rather indistinct and are becoming increasingly more so....  [T]he laws of 
physics and chemistry should, in principle, be able to explain and predict 
biological phenomena in a precise manner.  Understanding these aspects of 
the life sciences in the terms of mathematical modeling and theoretical 
applications of universal laws and principles is one of our greatest challenges 
for the next century."9  
In light of these premises of the natural scientist, so fruitful in exploration of what we 
may call the world of force and its "mechanisms" ⎯ to use my father's word ⎯ , finding a place 
for human purpose is an effort, to say the least.  It is a long step from a working-day 
"methodological naturalism" to denying or to thinking one must deny the real existence of 
purpose even in the evening.  But the step is taken, to an "ontological naturalism" declared and 
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taught.  A proper attention to the way things are, to which the development of statistical 
techniques and analysis can contribute, is joined to a cosmic impossibility of an ought and the 
way things might be.  We see all around how easily this happens.  Then with the departure of 
purpose goes value, beyond "preference" which is the leaning of a system.  And with the 
departure of value the distinctively legal meaning of "norm" in "legal norm" is stripped away, as 
Paul Freund feared even in 1961. 
But purpose and value are everywhere in the discipline of law.  They always have been, 
they are now, and they signal the first and immediate difference between law and social science, 
the nature of a "legal rule."  Different in the most basic way is what goes by the name "rule" in 
social science, what must be ultimately its character, from what goes by the name "rule" in law, 
this somewhat static form turning in the mind toward a more energetic form in the domestic and 
international hope for the "rule of law."  Of course it is a proper question and it is asked by 
lawyers themselves, why can't a "legal rule" become like a "rule" conceived within the terms of 
social science, why indeed is that not an ideal by the law's own lights, something graspable, 
predictable, "objectively" existing apart from the intentions, good faith, assent, and meaning of 
individuals and persons ⎯ like a rule of chess?  Much of the answer, I think, is that life is not a 
game, despite what we all sometimes say about life. 
Life is not a game and law is not, however much contest is brought into law as a device in 
inquiry and reflection.  Insofar as we are persons acting in positions that are not ours alone, that 
connect us to other individuals and that are defined by public value, there is an authenticity 
sought that is completely foreign to what we call "gaming".  Games that are play are relief and 
time out from life, which is serious, painful, often tragic, as real as can be, and sometimes we 
have to turn from the relief games give and, cliché though it is, say to ourselves, friends, our 
children, "This is for real, not a game."  Games can be good.  They can be an entry into 
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playfulness and its creativity.  There may be an aesthetic experience in games, a dance in them.  
But games, as games, are empty and their emptiness is a source of their relief and pleasure, the 
unconflicted joy in the exercise of capacities that they allow.  It makes no difference what the 
outcome is, really.  The end of the game, as game, is only a prelude to the beginning of another.   
This difference in present character and ultimate ideal between legal rules and scientific 
rules is wrapped up with the centrality of authority in law, a phenomenon from which a social 
scientist would backpedal as if his very identity as scientist depended upon his distance from it.  
Listen to the distinguished contemporary neuroscientist, Jean-Pierre Changeux, turning to the 
question whether the ordering of society might be "elevated" to the rank of a science.  Changeux 
speaks of the "task of devising precise rules of conduct," "the various prescriptions that regulate 
behavior at a given moment of the history of a society," that "entire set of rules of interactions 
among the individual members of a social group."  He observes, as did the Commission on the 
Life Sciences at Michigan which I quoted before, that ultimately those "precise rules," those 
"prescriptions that regulate behavior," "that entire set of rules of interaction," must be 
translatable into "hierarchical and parallel sets of neurons [that] contribute to the cognitive 
functions that jointly construct a code of right action," and must be understood in terms of 
natural selection, not just as the grounding of work in biology, but as a total theory of the world.  
"Darwinian variations of social representations," Changeux says working from the unstated 
premises of many today in his and in related fields ⎯ "Darwinian variations" by which he means 
differences in "social representations" thrown up by chance on the model of genetic mutation ⎯ 
"[are] propagated from one brain to another, selected at the level of the community, and finally 
retained in the minds of lawmakers."10 
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What is critical in law is nowhere to be seen in this or any formulation like it, including 
that with which we began ⎯ "{›,S}," "an operating, working modifiable mechanism... the 
modifiable component of which is a system of constraining and prescriptive law and rule."11  
Implicit even in references to "precise rules of conduct" and "the entire set of rules of 
interactions among members of a social group," emanating from the neural structures of 
"lawmakers," is the order that might be given after someone says, "But that would be illegal," 
whether taking a baby from her mother or drilling for oil in the Arctic wilderness.  Or the order 
that might be given after saying, "Yes, that is legitimate," again taking a baby from her mother or 
drilling for oil.12  Or, indeed, the order implicit in opinions issued through an appellate hierarchy 
on how to structure ongoing thinking and argument.  Orders are implicit but what is forgotten, 
and forgotten throughout discussion of law in social scientific terms translatable into basic 
science, is the correlative of an order, obedience.13  Never reached is why others out there obey, 
repeating the order in their own voice and words with their own sense of it, and implementing it 
or responding to it in good faith ⎯ not so much why they should obey but why they do obey, 
pay attention and continue to pay attention when there are so often so many reasons not to, when 
so much is at stake.  What is forgotten, in short, is authority, the premise and the object of legal 
thinking, legal argument, and legal conclusion, kept untouched by modernity's challenges to 
authority elsewhere, and not only kept but expanded with expanded claims for law, the "rule" of 
law, "law" expanding around the world.14  
One reason for forgetting the presence of authority in law ⎯ and the inevitable issuing of 
orders and question of obedience ⎯ is the historical association of the development of scientific 
and social scientific work with struggles for freedom of thought accompanying the political 
struggles of the last few centuries ⎯ freedom of thought that, in an ironic turn, total theorists in 
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the sciences today are so strenuously trying to limit.  But more basic in the forgetting is the 
erasure of the individual in scientific and social scientific thought, both the individual facing a 
claim of authority, listening and herself judging, and the individual contemplated and protected 
in and by law.  Neither is the person really there in scientific and social scientific thought, the 
individual person or the corporate or institutional person, other than as a linguistic shorthand for 
a system.  Nor is there living value that makes claims on us.  Authority, person, value, individual 
⎯ none are there, ultimately, in social science.  All are there at the center of law.   
After the experience of the twentieth century, its struggles and its horrors, the erasure of 
the individual is the most glaring.  Units of one kind or another of course figure in any 
professional thought and discussion.  It is widely said today that as interacting units you and I are 
"adaptive systems."  Someone using this term in professional scientific discourse would add, if 
pushed, "and nothing more," an addition critical to the difference between such professional 
thought and legal thought.  Pictured in this way a human being at any particular point in the 
course of life is a snapshot of the particular and changing outcome of two factors interacting over 
time, internal system and external system, nature and nurture, genetic endowment and 
environment.  Journalists recently sought out expert commentary on why a man waiting for the 
subway with his two daughters leapt to press down between the tracks and save the life of a man 
who had suffered a seizure and fallen in front of an oncoming train.  What was offered was that 
he had within him an "impulse" that was "followed spontaneously, either by virtue of genetic 
disposition or childhood/cultural training."15  These were the two sources of what this human 
unit was. 
But this isn't the way we think about the individual ⎯ not me thinking, not you I 
imagine, not even those who speak in these terms.  The word for the unique product of the action 
and interaction of the two factors, internal system and external system, is in fact not "individual" 
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but "phenotype."  The way we do think about the individual is reflected in law and legal thought, 
and includes something more than internal and external system, something "in" the individual ⎯ 
you, me, the scientist and social scientist too ⎯ which holds all of us back from vivisecting each 
other, which almost holds us back from torture.16  That is something real in social scientists' 
minds and hearts and lives.  It is real in law and legal thought, in which they themselves 
participate, not least when they are facing an order or asked to carry one out.  Its reality, its 
presence, is alone enough to keep law from being a social science or ever becoming a social 
science.17 
It is almost embarrassing to make these points, they are so obvious, so unoriginal.  
Making them is like looking up and saying there is a sun in the sky.  But they do need to be 
made, and made more explicitly than they have been.  I have painted law as proceeding rather on 
its own, too important to be affected at its core by what has happened in academic law over the 
last half century.  But of course law has been affected.  That is why it is better to think of law, 
with all it presupposes and makes real in human life and thought, as "resilient" rather than 
impervious.   
Particularly striking, I think, has been the attempt to fit the law of the central private 
institution of our time, the business corporation, to the premises of social science.  Twentieth-
century corporate law developed along lines analogous to the development of public 
administrative law, with the focus on the decision being made on behalf of the corporate body, 
and the questions being the authority of the decisionmaker, the enforcement of the decision if 
challenged, and the values and considerations procedural and substantive taken into account by 
the decisionmaker, or not taken into account.18  In the 1970s and 1980s a push began, to replace 
this analysis ⎯ which assumed that profit in a competitive market was the primary but not 
11
Vining:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2008
12 
exclusive consideration if the corporation was a business corporation ⎯ with analysis on the 
assumption that for business corporations the legal standard was "maximization" of profit.  The 
very notion of "maximization" was drawn from Western microeconomic theory and from 
biology, where "maximization" describes what must be done to survive in evolutionary 
competition or competition in a "perfect market."  In terms of the process of decisionmaking, 
what began to be taught in law schools as well as business schools was that "business" thinking 
was supposed to be wholly calculating and manipulative, with no place in it for any genuine 
concern for effects on employees, retirees, the surrounding community, the nation, or the world.   
This push, coincident with the movement of James Buchanan's "homo economicus" into 
the academic picture of legislative drafting, administrative regulation, and judicial 
decisionmaking, reached the American Law Institute in the 1980s and early 1990s.  It was 
proposed that the Institute state that the purpose of the business corporation should be "long-term 
maximization" of corporate profit and shareholder gain.  This was rejected as a reading of the 
law, judicial or statutory.  The reason was explicit, that it referred to "maximization" which, the 
Council of the Institute observed, would eliminate any authentic consideration of public value.  
"Maximization" of profit was replaced by "conduct of business activities with a view to 
enhancing" profit, in the Institute's statement of what a "business purpose" was in corporate 
law.19   
But the teaching of maximization in its economic and biological sense continued even 
after the Enron case laid bare just what was being taught.  The response of the law, that in the 
"name" of which individuals speak, was to move during this same period to the application of the 
criminal law to the corporate entity itself ⎯ criminal law, in which the attitude toward public 
value described by "maximization" precisely fits the standard formulation of what makes action 
or inaction criminal, the element of mens rea, the criminal mind.  As an example, causing death 
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(a fact) becomes murder (a crime) as a result of "extreme indifference to the value of human 
life."20  That development in corporate criminality, state and federal, substantively and in 
sentencing, legislatively and administratively, reintroduces taking into account values for their 
own sake in decisions made on behalf of a business corporation.  It has been fought in turn, and 
the struggle continues today.  The struggle points up not only the effect of the effort to push 
economic premises into legal thought, but law's resilience: here it is living value, pushed out at 
one point, that can be seen reentering analysis at another point. 
On a larger canvas, there has been an attempt to introduce into legal thought generally a 
form of "cost-benefit" analysis that excludes all else, in line with the totalizing thought called 
"scientific" so frequently today.  There is, as is said, "nothing sacred," nothing that is just not 
done, nothing that is not touched.  It shows in the reopening of the question of torture.21  "What 
does that mean, 'outrages upon personal dignity'?," the President asked in the struggle recently 
over the criminality of violations of the Geneva Conventions.  "That's a statement that is wide 
open to interpretation," he continued.  "And what I am proposing is that there be clarity in the 
law so that our professionals will have no doubt that what they are doing is legal... They don't 
want to be tried as war criminals.  They don't want to break the law."22  What the President was 
reflecting is a view of law very much affected by its identification with social science.  There are 
large implications ⎯ this is one of them ⎯ of the absence there of person, purpose, value, 
individual, all folded into the term "human dignity" found in the various Conventions against 
inhumane treatment of human beings.  Person, purpose, value, individual are mocked, and not 
just in discussions of torture, as being vague, too "imprecise" to affect "rational" decisionmaking 
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It should not be overlooked that the current biological view of the living world may well 
have grown out of economics, rather than the reverse.  The axiomatic hostility to what modern 
biology calls "vitalism" mirrors the cynicism ⎯ the moral stance ⎯ of a view of the human as 
intrinsically alone, ruthlessly self-seeking for a self that is axiomatically limited.  The denial of 
the humane in the human is not everywhere in biology and economics, but it is prominent 
enough; and with and through these disciplines there has been imported into thought and 
discussion in law the dichotomy seen in both, between the "selfish" and the "altruistic," with the 
selfish the undeniably basic and the altruistic an illusion eventually to be understood in a way 
consistent with the selfish.  Not for nothing is the widespread popularity in academic discussion 
of the "prisoner's dilemma."  Its imagery, imprisonment and threat from others of pain or death, 
fits an underlying vision of what it is to be human ⎯ utterly alone in the world and knowing that 
one is utterly alone in the world.   
But again this is not the view of law, which over time has more and more protected the 
humane in the human.  The individual contains the whole world, but is not alone.  The individual 
is connected with others through participation in the life of living value, to which legal language 
makes constant reference, participation indeed in the creation of living value.  As Alasdair 
MacIntyre has recently shown so well in his Dependent Rational Animals,23 there is no such 
dichotomy of the selfish and altruistic in the real world, which is the world of law, where we are 
all dependent or disabled at some point in our lives, receiving from those whom we cannot repay 
and giving to those who cannot repay us, unpredictably and disproportionately in both the giving 
and the receiving. 
In this connection too, I might note as another example of law's resilience that the 
acknowledgment of the full range of living value, which developed during the first three quarters 
of the twentieth century in the law of standing and the very conception of who a legal person can 
14
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 87 [2008]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art87
15 
be, still stands despite pressure on it from biological and economic thinking.  The decoupling of 
the common law of judicial jurisdiction from "property" and "contract," the abandonment of the 
so-called "legal interest test" of an earlier time, remains undisturbed by the presence of "homo 
economicus" in academic teaching and discussion.24 
The attempt to challenge the absolute prohibition in law of the torture of human beings is 
emblematic, as is the attempt to reconceive the nature of the legal persons we call business 
corporations.  The language and the way of thinking shown in this challenge and this 
reconception are case studies in the implications of identifying law with social science.  But there 
is a canvas larger still that may include the question of torture.  On it can be projected not only 
the implications of the pressure on law from this identification, but law's resilience under this 
pressure: the pushing back, that the mind can feel, of the individual, the person, purpose, 
responsibility, living value. 
Before us is a prospect of a kind different from the movement into law of biological 
thinking and such social scientific thinking that blends into it ⎯ economic, psychological, 
sociological, historicist.  We are faced in law with the achievements of biological science within 
its own sphere and with developments in technology that permit manipulation in light of its 
achievements.  The very real possibility now of the creation of forms of being that are hybrids of 
humans and animals, the circumvention of the breeding barrier that has heretofore identified an 
individual as of one or another kind, or species, raises the old question of slavery in a new 
context.  And as Kazuo Ishiguro has explored quietly and effectively,25 the possibility of beings 
genetically engineered for organ donation also raises that old question of the association of 
property with human flesh.  What is human, what less than human, law and lawyers will be 
asked, what or who is an individual in the sense that we speak of individuals in law, what or who 
is a person, what material forms of being human or almost human can be bought and sold and 
15
Vining:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2008
16 
exploited, and, yes, treated as animal?  In addition to this ⎯ the question of slavery ⎯ the 
genetic engineering of individuals whether or not in hybrid form, the possibility of human 
clones, and the selecting of embryos "in" or "out" in human reproductive technology all raise the 
eugenic question again in a twenty-first century context.   
Slavery and eugenics ⎯ one would have thought the one was resolved by the late 
nineteenth century and the other by the mid-twentieth.  The struggle with them is before us still.  
If anyone is dubious about the seriousness of the conflict when biological and eugenic thinking 
come to the front of the legal mind, I suggest reading or reading again the Supreme Court's 
decision on race and slavery in Dred Scott, that creatures with traces of African blood in them 
could never reach a position of full human dignity and responsibility.  There were two dissents, 
Justice McLean's dissent pointing away from the biological and eugenic in a clear statement not 
so much of law as of law's difference, a statement of what it can comprehend that is simply not 
comprehensible within the framework being pressed upon it: "A slave is not a mere chattel.  He 
bears the impress of his Maker, and is amenable to the laws of God and man; and he is destined 
to an endless existence."26  Or read Buck v. Bell on eugenics, that the poor, the less clever in 
calculating, the violators of rules, were less than fully human and should not contribute to the 
future material of the human form of being.  This was the 1927 Court of Holmes, Stone, 
Brandeis, and Taft.  There was one dissent without opinion.27  It may be notable that this sole 
dissent was by the only member of the Catholic Church on the court, Justice Butler, who went to 
Mass every morning, and that by 1927 the Church's teaching was pointing toward the universal 
human dignity latent in law's distinctive recognition of the individual.28   
Dred Scott was overruled by John Brown, Harriet Beecher Stowe, a war, and a century of 
internal legal development, but we are not certainly away from it yet.  Buck v. Bell has been 
reviled but never overruled or repudiated.  The questions of slavery and eugenics persist, as 
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questions.  How then can it be thought law will stay resilient under these pressures and in face of 
such enormous demands as these, when the very grounding of the human may be shifting under 
foot?   
Law will stay resilient because the individual at home in law is the bedrock, prior to any 
discussion of history or process, or presently existing system, or scientific conclusion, in fact 
prior to any discussion of "the individual."  Though some individual waves his wand at us again 
and again, we are not changed from the individuals we are into products or statistical notions.  
Beyond that bedrock ⎯ our actual presence to one another ⎯ I should say there is some 
assurance in the fact that law, with its presuppositions and more than presupposition, its 
ontology, is the one thing other than food that we cannot do without.  Social scientists too, even 
they, cannot do without it.   
Among the particulars that might be noted as we look forward, the worldwide 
development of human rights law,29 anticipated and perhaps in some way affected by the 
evidence of the lonely dissents in Dred Scott and Buck v. Bell, is founded on a vision of the 
individual and of the nature of value that social science cannot share, and insofar as domestic law 
is pressed by that mode of thought, international law can reach back and recall.  Even while law 
in general was being identified in teaching and discussion with social science in general, 
international law emerging from the revelatory horrors of "our" century was making implausible 
the identification of "legal rules" that live in human minds and speech with rules that can be 
conceived in the terms of social science.  Indeed the development of the web of international 
conventions on genocide, on torture, on human experimentation, on inhumane treatment, on 
behalf of the disabled, on behalf of women and children, has been loosening our own law from 
the positivism that began to affect it and thinking about it, at least in academic law, in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, before the fifty years past which are our concern here. 
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One of these international developments, proceeding from the mid-century Nuremberg 
Trials, has been especially important in protecting the understanding of the human individual as 
something more than the product of genetic and environmental systems.  These are the legal 
limitations on experimentation on human individuals, that arena where the legal vision of the 
human being and the scientific and social scientific vision explicitly confront one another.  Such 
experimentation in the United States had its own eugenic and authoritarian cast, its subjects 
disproportionately children, the poor, the military, or those who had some forebears who had 
suffered slavery, and it was not pulled back substantially until the 1970s and 1980s.   
I would add as important too the developing conception in law of the sentient beings we 
call animals, the other part of the hybrids I have mentioned.  This development is another reason 
to believe that commitments to living value, to the individual, and to a dimension of reality that 
sustains and attracts what we might call law's eschatological thrust have been fundamentally 
unaffected.  It too has its international side.  Legally recognizing interests that are not proxies of 
human interests and acknowledging a shared sentience and special human responsibility for its 
protection has something of an a fortiori effect.  In many ways the treatment of animals was the 
horror in the revelatory events of the twentieth century as human beings were treated as animals 
so systematically and so cruelly, and when it comes to our own behavior toward each other we 
should eventually be able to exclaim, "Why, you wouldn't do this to an animal."  Pulling the 
treatment of animals toward the treatment or the "legitimate" treatment of human beings rather 
than the treatment of human beings toward the treatment of animals is a working out of 
something within law, pushed by law's restlessness with incoherence but also by law's 
eschatological thrust, the pointing to a whole from the partial, which can be seen whenever the 
word "justice" is mentioned in the same breath as the word "law."  That in secular terms might be 
thought "Hegelian" or "Platonic" ⎯ though Hegel had contempt for the American experiment, 
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and there is the possibility Plato might have too.  I prefer myself to think in terms of John 
Noonan's articulation of the way an inner logic of a human institution works itself out over long 
periods of time, on slavery, on torture, and on the ownership and exploitation of women and 
children.30   
To be sure, whenever the border between human and animal is opened to any extent there 
can be migration in both directions across it.  Hearing the "cry of animals" as human cries are 
heard can reverse and can become hearing human cries as the cries of animals.  An essay by a 
neurologist featured in The Chronicle of Higher Education a few years ago proposed that human 
language and literature "grow out of a biological system for attempting to fill needs," and the 
piece argued for "reuniting language with the screams and cries of animal communication, 
looking at it as a secretion of one of the spongiest organs in the body."31  But I think the 
movement across today's more porous border between human and animal is rather in the other 
direction, as the evolutionary biologist Simon Conway Morris is so eloquently arguing.32   
Mention of a view of language as "a secretion of one of the spongiest organs in the body" 
leads me to two final indications of the essential health of the legal mind.  One is the growing 
sophistication about the nature of human language and its constitutive action in law.  I was 
exposed to a precursor of it studying under Lon Fuller in the 1960s.33  But a full focus on the 
importance of language began at about the same time as the development of public choice theory 
and similar schools of thought in economics and their movement in various ways into academic 
law.  That full focus is the work of James Boyd White, in volume after volume.34  White has 
made clear that the sounds made by isolated competitors contending with one another, or the 
sounds made in advertising or political manipulation, are not the language of a person and not 
language with the force of law, but the sounds of force and force alone.  I emphasize "alone" 
because they fit a vision of the human world, indeed the universe itself, in which there are 
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ultimately only forces (as Oliver Wendell Holmes once said).  This is not the world of law.  
Because of White and his work it can be said with confidence that when Steven Pinker or 
Herbert Simon and the disciplines with which they are associated speak of language, its origins, 
mechanisms, and meaning, they are not talking about human language, nor the language of law, 
but about something else, in rather the same way that so many who set out to study the idea of 
God are not thinking about God, but about something else.35 
There is, secondly, a new openness of mind among figures prominent in discussion of 
organized human life.  The representative figure outside law may be Jürgen Habermas, whose 
grappling with the issues raised by our new capacities for manipulation of the material substrate 
of the human has led him to acknowledge the sometime dependence of secular discussion on a 
dimension of reality that is not secular ⎯ in his words, "to the reasonable attitude of keeping 
one's distance from religion without closing one's mind to the perspective it offers," or, again, 
"keeping a distance... from a religious tradition whose normative substance we nevertheless feed 
on," or, again, acknowledging "moral feelings which only religious language has as yet been able 
to give a sufficiently differentiated expression."36   
This openness, which can be seen more widely in arriving at consensus at each stage in 
the expansion of universal human rights, is beginning to be matched within law by an 
increasingly explicit acknowledgment of an uninterrupted ontological commitment in law to a 
dimension of reality which, whether or not it is or is called religious, has no place in scientific 
work or social science.  Perhaps it can never have and should not have a place, given the power 
of the scientific method in understanding and possibly freeing us to some degree from the blind 
systems of the world with which and within which we live.  The representative figure I would 
point to in this connection is Steven Douglas Smith, whose work and contributions to law's self-
understanding have also been developing alongside the movements with which I began.37  
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Habermas and those who work with his work, White and those who work with his, Smith and 
those who work with his ⎯ other examples could be taken from this volume:  all these are not 
going to go away.  If law and the legal mind were a rough tough animal, they are nourishing its 
bones and sinew.  There is, both within law, even in academic law, and outside law, even in 
academic social science and social theory, increasing awareness that the human which the 
humanist insists is "all we've got" includes an open dimension to which there is really no limit. 
This should not be surprising.  The world of the active mathematician is not accessible to 
many, even though the operation and application of mathematics may be.  But it is a familiar 
thing to hear that mathematicians who call themselves realists acknowledge a dimension of 
reality that transcends the here and now of our developing physical existence.  They say, and 
invite us to accept, that natural selection as a "theory of everything" does not reach and cannot 
explain mathematics, which is not, in itself, reducible to the organization of neural tissue, but is 
real in a realm of its own.  Lawyers and all those actively participating in law who are realistic 
about their thought and action acknowledge a dimension of human experience of reality that is 
not at all the same as that of realist mathematicians, but, like theirs, lies both beneath and beyond 
the realities admitted by the rules and presuppositions of the natural and social sciences. 
Law will be tough enough in the future.  We can speculate why it has not been tougher in 
the past.  There are tensions within law, as there are in your and my own thought, and there 
always have been.  Identification of law with social science can have been an effort to escape 
them.  Social science and science behind it perhaps need not have pressed so.  They might just 
have offered themselves, for there is a constant pull toward the authoritarian, the meaningless, 
the automatic, away from responsibility, away from facing grief for what we ourselves do.  Work 
in law even has an element of the frightening in it, which must be handled in some way.  Just as 
there is biblical awe, dread, and fear, so too can it be positively frightening to think that what is 
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necessary to authenticity of any kind at any level ⎯ and necessary therefore to authority, and 
therefore to law ⎯ runs straight up to a transcendent dimension of the universe.  This is a 
problem the social scientist of our time, thinking as a social scientist, does not have.  But the 
lawyer does. 
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